🇷🇺 Russia's Mistakes: Fatal Miscalculations of Modern Russia and Their Consequences

The empire dug its own grave and is sinking in now

Over the recent stretch of its modern history Russia has committed a series of fatal mistakes and strategic miscalculations that have already led to catastrophic consequences and further threaten both the country’s economic stability and its sovereignty.

Unlike the decisions to annex Crimea in 2014 and to create hotspots of tension in the separatist regions of Donbas, which were largely reactive, shaped by situational geopolitical circumstances, the decision to launch a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the result of many years of deliberate preparation. Russia had been preparing for this operation in advance and for a long time.

However, despite this prolonged preparation period the military and political planning turned out to be fundamentally flawed. Neither the strategic goal nor the means of achieving it were adequately assessed. Russia’s economic and technological readiness for a regime of isolation was grossly overestimated both in terms of the depth of its resource base and its capacity to substitute Western technologies, capital, and markets. As a result, years of preparation failed to achieve any of the operational objectives (the blitzkrieg failed), ensure economic resilience (sanctions inflicted deep damage) or secure international diplomatic backing (the West united, China distanced itself).

Thus, the core mistake lies in the gap between the state's ambitions and its actual capabilities where previous patterns of perceived success, such as Crimea and Donbas, were mistakenly extrapolated onto a new situation involving a fundamentally higher level of risk and resistance.

Misjudgment of Ukraine and the West’s Response

One of Russia’s most serious miscalculations was the deep underestimation of the determination of Ukrainian society and the armed forces to resist. The Russian leadership operated under the false assumption that Kyiv would capitulate within a few days or that the Ukrainian government would be quickly overthrown by internal forces. At the root of this delusion were distorted views of the weakness of the Ukrainian state, an underestimation of the growth of national consciousness since 2014 and erroneous calculations based on internal divisions and pro-Russian sentiments.

In practice however, Ukraine demonstrated a high level of societal mobilization, political resilience and military adaptation facilitated by both Western support and internal consensus. As a result, this misjudgment led to the failure of the blitzkrieg and turned the war into a protracted, exhausting conflict accompanied by enormous human, economic and military losses for which Russia was unprepared.

The second critical miscalculation was the gross underestimation of the West’s response to the military invasion of Ukraine. Moscow wrongly believed that economic interests, Europe’s energy dependence on Russian oil and gas and accumulated internal divisions within the EU and NATO would act as restraining factors preventing Western countries from taking a swift and united stance. The Russian leadership relied on the logic of 2014 when the annexation of Crimea triggered a relatively mild response and limited sanctions. But by 2022, the situation had changed. The invasion was not only a shock to the West but also a catalyst for an unprecedented consolidation of the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom and NATO. The response was swift and large-scale.

Unprecedented economic sanctions were imposed, multibillion-dollar military, intelligence and financial support was provided to Ukraine, and NATO’s military presence in Eastern Europe was significantly reinforced. As a result, Russia found itself not only in international isolation but also facing systemic economic and military-political opposition for which it was unprepared.

Most importantly, what happened was exactly what Russia had long tried to avoid and had declared a “red line” of its foreign policy. NATO expanded eastward to include Finland and Sweden resulting in a dramatic increase in Russia’s total border with the alliance. Consequently, instead of the promised “demilitarization” and “pushing NATO back,” Russia achieved the exact opposite outcome. NATO became closer, larger and stronger consolidating Moscow’s strategic defeat in the geopolitical dimension for decades to come.

Overestimated Confidence in Economic Resilience

Another key strategic mistake was the overestimated confidence in Russia’s own economic resilience and its ability to withstand sanctions pressure. The Russian leadership assumed that the West’s response to the invasion of Ukraine would be similar to the events of 2014. They anticipated and rehearsed limited sanctions, partially symbolic measures and a gradual adaptation of international partners to a new reality. Based on this, calculations were made that the Russian economy, accumulated reserves and energy exports would allow the country to relatively painlessly survive potential isolation.

However, this calculation turned out to be fundamentally flawed. Moscow grossly underestimated the extent of Russia’s structural dependence on Western technologies, financial systems, investments and industrial supplies. It proved impossible to compensate for the rupture of technological chains and to replace critically important components including those in mechanical engineering, aviation, shipbuilding, microelectronics and the military-industrial complex.

One of the key factors that had the most painful impact on the Russian economy was the massive and multi-layered sanctions campaign which led to the country’s deep financial isolation. The first blow was the disconnection of Russian banks from the SWIFT system which paralyzed international settlements, especially in foreign economic activities, forcing Russian businesses to switch to yuan-based transactions increasing costs and slowing trade.

The second step was the freezing of the Central Bank of Russia’s foreign currency reserves exceeding $300 billion which deprived the country of access to key financial buffers and undermined trust in the ruble as a reserve currency. The situation was aggravated by the mass withdrawal of Western banks and investors which caused a capital deficit, increased borrowing costs and narrowed financial opportunities.

The most painful blow to Russia, whose economy remains largely resource-based and export-oriented, was the energy isolation. Moscow operated under the deeply rooted belief that Europé, being critically dependent on Russian oil and gas, would not dare to make a radical break in energy relations. However, the imposition of an embargo on oil, petroleum products and gas supplies, as well as the introduction of price caps by the EU and G7, completely invalidated those assumptions. Russia was forced to export energy resources at a deep discount, losing volumes, a significant share of revenues and ceding market positions to competitors.

In parallel, logistics chains and transport corridors were broken, further weakening the country’s export capabilities. Transport costs increased, access to foreign markets worsened and the competitiveness of Russian raw materials on the global stage sharply declined. For an economy built on hydrocarbon exports this blow was not only unexpected but also systemic, disrupting the usual financial and foreign trade models that had sustained the country’s macroeconomic stability.

Equally destructive was the technological and industrial blockade expressed in a ban on the supply of high-tech products: microelectronics, chips, aviation components and dual-use equipment. Particularly painful was the withdrawal of Boeing and Airbus which endangered civil aviation and entire industrial sectors. This was followed by the departure of Western car manufacturers and engineering companies leading to the collapse of the automotive industry, a decline in product quality and an almost complete substitution by Chinese brands.

The defense-industrial complex proved especially vulnerable. The blockade of key components for precision weaponry led to a decline in quality and production volumes revealing a reliance on parallel imports. The situation was further complicated by sanctions against key state corporations—Rosneft, Gazprom, and Rostec—which limited their access to markets, technologies and investments causing stagnation and increased financing costs. Finally, personal sanctions against Russian elites and political leaders including asset freezes and travel bans became a tool of pressure that intensified capital flight and internal instability.

Taken together, all these measures not only caused significant economic damage but also laid the groundwork for long-term degradation, the loss of technological sovereignty and the transformation of Russia into a dependent raw material supplier for a limited circle of external partners. The intensified financial isolation caused a shortage of foreign currency, rising costs, a decline in exports in high-margin segments and dependence on a narrow circle of buyers, primarily China and India. As a result, the Russian economy became incapable not only of maintaining previous growth levels but also of adapting to the new reality creating a threat of long-term decline, deteriorating quality of life and the loss of economic sovereignty.

Military Mistakes

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was from the very beginning accompanied not only by a flawed strategic assessment but also by a series of critical military mistakes that predetermined the failures of the campaign’s first months and laid the groundwork for a protracted conflict. These mistakes were systemic in nature, affecting both the operational and tactical levels and their consequences continue to influence the dynamics of the war today.

The key military miscalculation was the failed organization of the initial phase of the invasion based on the erroneous assumption that Kyiv would fall within a few days. To achieve this goal Russia allocated forces that were too small and clearly insufficient for simultaneous offensives on multiple fronts towards Kyiv, Kharkiv and southern Ukraine. At the same time the Russian army encountered an unprepared and underdeveloped logistics network which made sustainable supply to advancing units impossible.

A sharp shortage of reserves, the absence of deep-echeloned support, worn-out equipment and underestimation of the density of Ukrainian defenses led to the rapid exhaustion of assault groups. The result was defeat near Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson where Russian troops were forced to abandon previously occupied positions. This failure had long-term consequences. Strategic initiative was lost, the Ukrainian army gained moral and military superiority and the conflict turned into a prolonged and exhausting war for which Russian forces were unprepared both psychologically and materially.

The second major mistake was the extensive use of private military companies (PMCs), primarily the Wagner Group, as well as other mercenary structures as the main strike force on certain frontlines. This move was initially caused by a shortage of combat-ready regular forces but later led to the systemic erosion of the military chain of command. The use of PMCs, instead of enhancing the army’s effectiveness, created chaos in command, competition for resources and a weakening of centralized control which negatively affected the overall combat capability of Russian forces.

PMCs operated in parallel with army units demonstrating their own command, supply, and interest systems and in some areas showing much greater combat effectiveness than regular forces. This led to acute internal conflicts culminating in Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023 — an unprecedented case of an armed mercenary group openly rebelling against Russia’s military and political leadership. Even after the mutiny was suppressed, trust in the top command was undermined and control over the security structures weakened.

The third systemic mistake was the inadequate understanding and application of modern standards of warfare. The Russian army operating under outdated doctrines of massed offensives and firepower, proved highly vulnerable to new types of weapons and enemy tactics.

Above all, it showed an inability to effectively counter high-precision long-range artillery and systems like HIMARS which allowed Ukrainian forces to strike logistics hubs, command posts and depots. The absence of a layered and modern air defense system made Russian troops vulnerable to massive drone attacks leading to significant losses in equipment, personnel and key infrastructure.

At the same time, much heavier consequences were avoided largely due to the fact that the use of HIMARS and other long-range systems remained limited by political constraints set by the West, as well as due to the extremely limited number of these weapons in the Ukrainian army’s possession. These systems were essentially used in a "piecemeal" manner which did not allow Ukraine to fully realize their potential for large-scale destruction of Russian rear areas. Thus, it was external restrictions, not effective Russian action, that played a key role in keeping HIMARS strikes local rather than catastrophic.

Additionally, the Russian army faced an acute shortage of quality intelligence and a lack of situational awareness on the battlefield making timely response and maneuvering impossible. All of this led to Russia losing control over significant territories, suffering heavy losses in manpower and equipment, and turning every offensive attempt into a local failure or a minor success at enormous cost.

Taken together, these military mistakes formed a vicious spiral of failures from which Russia has been unable to escape even after years of war. The collapse of the first phase, the destruction of the command system through reliance on PMCs and the inability to adapt to modern warfare standards led to the loss of strategic initiative, rising casualties, declining morale and a prolonged conflict for which the country was not prepared neither organizationally nor economically. These mistakes do not merely define the course of the war today, they largely predetermine its long-term consequences for the Russian army and the state as a whole.

Political Mistakes

Russia’s foreign and domestic political course in the context of the war in Ukraine demonstrates a series of fatal errors that exacerbated both the country’s international isolation and internal instability. These mistakes were the result of an inadequate assessment of the international environment, an overestimation of its own strength and a refusal to adopt flexibility in decision-making. Taken together they weakened Russia’s position not only on the foreign policy front but also within its own system of power.

One of the key political mistakes was the refusal to pursue diplomatic resolution and compromise in the early stages of the conflict in the spring of 2022 when Russia still had the opportunity to secure certain territorial gains while avoiding deep international confrontation and large-scale sanctions. After the initial failures of the military campaign, the leadership continued to bet on escalation instead of seeking a political solution, mistakenly counting on a military breakthrough and forcing Ukraine into capitulation.

Instead of using influence and fear of further war to consolidate its position at the negotiating table, Russia consistently rejected all compromise formats including potentially favorable negotiations in Istanbul. This refusal not only deprived Moscow of the opportunity to dictate the terms of peace but also led to further escalation of the conflict, the West entering into an active phase of support for Ukraine and the transformation of the war into a long-term, exhausting process. Today, Russia’s diplomatic options are significantly narrowed and its influence over the negotiation process is minimal, strategically worsening its position.

A significant political misstep was Russia’s excessive and unjustified reliance on nuclear rhetoric as a tool of strategic pressure. From the early months of the conflict Moscow actively employed threats of nuclear weapon use including hints at the possibility of strikes on European territory. This tactic was initially intended to produce a psychological effect, deter Western intervention and instill fear of escalation.

However, such frequent and aggressive use of nuclear threats had the opposite effect. At a certain point they ceased to be taken seriously as a real leverage mechanism. Western countries gradually adapted to this rhetoric, developed response scenarios and built collective immunity to nuclear blackmail. Instead of strengthening Moscow’s diplomatic position this policy contributed to even greater NATO cohesion and reinforced the anti-Russian consensus.

As a result, Russia not only lost the effectiveness of this instrument but also damaged its image as a rational and responsible nuclear state which may, in the future, undermine its position in strategic stability and security negotiations.

Domestically Russia chose a course of harsh repression, suppression and dismantling of the remnants of the rule of law which was a second serious political mistake. The authorities responded to the crisis not by attempting to maintain social and political flexibility but by tightening the repressive apparatus which affected all areas of life from mass media to the academic and cultural spheres.

This process was accompanied by the liquidation of independent media, persecution of political opponents, strict censorship and the creation of an atmosphere of fear. Outwardly, this preserved an appearance of stability but at a deeper level, it led to the loss of decision-making flexibility and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In an authoritarian vertical that suppresses any alternative opinions, even within the elites, it becomes impossible to correct strategic errors or mitigate their consequences.

As a result, trust in the leadership within elite circles is gradually declining and the mistakes made at the beginning of the conflict are not corrected but accumulate, turning the governance system into an inert and poorly manageable mechanism.

The third political mistake was ignoring the positions and interests of key international partners, primarily China, India, Kazakhstan and other countries of the “Global South” which initially maintained a neutral or highly cautious stance toward the conflict. Instead of building a delicately balanced, multi-vector diplomacy engaging in dialogue and listening to these countries’ concerns and proposals, Russia sank deeper into confrontational rhetoric and brute-force actions that contradicted even the expectations of its potential allies.

Particularly damaging was Russia’s shift from diplomatic language to crude imposition of its own truth and the use of unproven and often absurd accusations against the Ukrainian leadership — a communication style that clearly fell outside the bounds of customary international discourse. Even friendly states perceived this rhetoric as toxic and inappropriate, undermining their own positions and creating risks of being drawn into a crisis they sought to distance themselves from.

Russia’s inability to respond to cautious signals from China, India, and other key actors who aimed to preserve economic stability and room to maneuver between conflicting sides, led to its loss of influence over their positions and increasing dependence and subordination in relations with Beijing. China, while maintaining a façade of neutrality and demonstrative support, has steadily used Russia’s weakening to extract unilateral economic and political benefits.

As a result, Russia lost not only its levers of influence over its partners but also its ability to independently shape the foreign policy agenda, gradually becoming an object of others’ games rather than an active participant. The political mistakes made by Russia during the war have created a situation in which the country simultaneously lost the ability to control the dynamics of the conflict through negotiations, encountered internal governance degradation and opacity that deprived the system of flexibility, became entangled in dangerous foreign policy dependence on China and forfeited its status as an independent global player.

Moreover, instead of using the unexpected goodwill of U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration as an opportunity for constructive dialogue and an exit from international isolation, Moscow bet on manipulating Washington’s desire for a quick peace deal. The Russian leadership interpreted Trump’s wish to secure a fast peace victory as a sign of weakness and began to exploit it for its own purposes dragging out the conflict, putting forward deliberately unacceptable conditions and counting on U.S. pressure on Kyiv. Thus, Russia not only failed to meet Trump’s expectations but also forfeited its chance to reset relations choosing the path of crude geopolitical games instead of diplomatic maneuvering. This behavior finally cemented Russia’s image as an unreliable and toxic actor even in the eyes of a potentially friendly American administration.

These mistakes have long-term consequences that go far beyond the current military campaign and shape negative scenarios for Russia’s future both as a state and as an international actor.

Economic Mistakes

In the context of war Russia has made a number of key economic mistakes that have exacerbated internal imbalances, undermined the stability of public finances and deprived the country of the ability to adapt to external and internal challenges. These mistakes not only worsen the current economic difficulties but also lay the groundwork for long-term stagnation and the loss of economic sovereignty.

One of the most serious mistakes was the sharp redistribution of resources in favor of the military economy expressed in the doubling, and in some sectors tripling, of military expenditures. At the same time civilian sectors—manufacturing, mechanical engineering, high technology, and the service industry—were either frozen or downsized. The structure of the economy began to resemble a mobilization model from the 20th century, unfit for the realities of modern multi-layered conflicts and hybrid threats.

As a result, this imbalance led to an increase in the budget deficit, financed through emergency borrowing and monetary emission, a decline in real household incomes, growing poverty and social discontent, and an intensification of inflationary pressures including in key consumer sectors.

The inadequacy of the reserve fund base which was supposed to offset the consequences of war and sanctions, became particularly acute. By the middle of the third year of the conflict, the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund was nearly depleted and the ability to replenish it had been exhausted due to declining oil and gas revenues and shrinking exports. Thus, the state is losing its last financial buffer capable of maintaining macroeconomic stability in the face of further shocks.

The second systemic mistake was the overestimation of Russia’s ability to quickly and effectively implement import substitution following the imposition of sanctions and the departure of Western companies. The Russian leadership expected that parallel imports and the development of domestic industries would make it possible to compensate for the loss of critical technologies, equipment and components in a short time.

However, reality proved otherwise. In industry and especially in the military-industrial complex there was a catastrophic shortage of high-tech components: microelectronics, machinery, aviation parts and dual-use materials. The collapse of logistical chains linking the Russian economy to global markets hit competitiveness and production quality, leading to technological backwardness in key sectors such as mechanical engineering, transportation, and defense, as well as a drop in both the volume and quality of exports limiting foreign currency earnings.

The third major mistake was the artificial and premature restriction of financial ties with Western markets including the abandonment of Western payment systems, the reduction of Western currencies in reserves and the transition to settlements in yuan and rubles without building effective financial institutions of its own. This self-isolation was undertaken preemptively in response to expected sanctions without the existence of real and sustainable alternatives resulting in a loss of confidence in the ruble both domestically and abroad, limiting international trade even with friendly or neutral countries and creating financial dependence on China whose currency and financial mechanisms have become essential for the survival of Russia’s foreign economic activity.

Instead of building multi-tiered financial flexibility, Russia effectively confined itself to a narrow corridor of options where control over its economic future is increasingly shifting beyond its borders. The tilt toward militarization, technological isolation and financial closure has created a situation in which Russia is depleting its reserves, losing industrial and scientific potential, becoming increasingly dependent on a limited number of partners and facing growing internal socio-economic instability.

These mistakes render the current economic model unsustainable in the long term threatening not only social well-being but also the political stability of the system as a whole.

Geopolitical Mistakes and Demographic Collapse

One of the most destructive consequences of Russia’s military aggression has been the rapid collapse of its influence in the post-Soviet space. Whereas Moscow previously maintained formal or informal leadership in the region through the CSTO, the EAEU, humanitarian influence and infrastructural interconnectedness, after 2022 the entire system experienced a sharp breakdown.

Ukraine has definitively become Russia’s antithesis not only on the political and military levels but also in terms of national identity. The country has taken a firmly anti-Russian stance, received substantial Western support and built its own security architecture completely severing ties with the Russian orbit.

Moldova intensified its course toward European integration and carried out institutional reforms strengthening pro-Western forces. Even Armenia, traditionally dependent on Russian military support, began to show signs of strategic reorientation after Russia’s failure to act as a security guarantor in the conflict with Azerbaijan. Yerevan is strengthening ties with the EU and India, publicly criticizing the CSTO’s ineffectiveness and questioning its long-term commitments to Moscow.

Kazakhstan, for its part, has taken a clearly independent foreign policy line. Astana refused to recognize the newly annexed Ukrainian territories, intensified economic cooperation with China, Turkey, and the West, and has effectively minimized its political involvement in integration initiatives under Russia’s aegis. Even Azerbaijan, previously seen by Moscow as a neutral partner, has asserted greater independence and, with Turkish support, pushed Russia out of its role as a power broker in the South Caucasus.

The situation in Georgia is more complex. Despite formally committing to EU and NATO integration, the country’s authorities (the “Georgian Dream” party) have taken a pragmatic and cautious stance toward Russia. In 2022–2024, they refused to impose sanctions, maintained economic ties with the Russian Federation and avoided anti-Russian rhetoric. However, Georgian society, especially youth and civil movements, consistently supports a pro-European direction. The country has seen mass protests against a “turn toward Moscow” and in favor of European integration. As a result, Georgia is caught in internal division between its government and its people where Russia’s influence remains only as a restraining tool, not as an attractive alternative.

Taken together, these developments point to the complete erosion of Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. Moscow is losing partners, levers of influence and even its image as the political center of gravity in the region. Each year, more former Soviet republics either move closer to alternative centers of power, such as the West, China, or Turkey, or begin to formulate independent strategies to avoid dependency on Russia.

Parallel to this geopolitical retreat, Russia is undergoing demographic degradation which is undermining its internal social and economic stability. Three years of war, mobilization, mass emigration and battlefield losses have led to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of working-age men from the economy. This is an irreparable loss for the manufacturing sector, agriculture, logistics and construction, especially in the context of an already aging population.

Particularly painful has been the loss of young and qualified citizens—IT specialists, entrepreneurs, students, and researchers—who have left the country en masse. The brain drain has taken on an irreversible character, especially against the backdrop of political repression, censorship and economic instability. Within the country, birth rates continue to fall, generational imbalances deepen and the burden on the pension system increases.

The economic consequences of demographic decline are already visible: a shrinking workforce, falling consumption, reduced domestic demand, and a contracting tax base. This limits the state’s capacity for fiscal maneuvering, worsens deficits and weakens the foundation for sustainable long-term growth. Under conditions of sanctions pressure and technological isolation, the demographic factor becomes a critical constraint on modernization and recovery.

The Structure of Responsibility for Strategic Failure

The set of errors that led Russia into a prolonged and exhausting war with Ukraine, the collapse of international relations, sanctions-induced isolation and a systemic crisis stems not only from failures in specific areas but from a fundamental breakdown in the entire decision-making system. Responsibility for this strategic catastrophe is multi-layered ranging from personalized to institutional and encompasses all key elements of Russia’s vertical power structure.

I. Political Leadership: Personalized Responsibility

The primary center of responsibility for initiating the war and escalating confrontation with the West lies with the top political leadership, first and foremost the President of the Russian Federation, who single-handedly determines foreign policy and authorizes the use of military force. It was at the level of the presidential apparatus and a narrow circle of close associates—representatives of the security services, the Security Council, and senior ideologues of the Presidential Administration—that key decisions were made based on flawed assessments and political illusions.

This "military-political core" committed a fatal failure in strategic forecasting overestimating Ukraine’s weakness and the West’s "fatigue," replacing rational analysis with ideological frameworks and historical myths. The main error was a personal conviction in a swift victory, disregard for external signals and suppression of any alternative assessments within the system itself.

II. Military Leadership: Failure of Planning and Adaptation

Key miscalculations at the operational and tactical levels stem from the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation which misjudged the real combat capabilities of the Ukrainian army, developed unrealistic and overly ambitious plans, failed to establish effective logistics and a stable supply system and did not ensure coordination between various military and paramilitary structures.

In addition, the allowance of parallel activity by private military companies (PMCs), especially the Wagner Group, without clear legal status or integration into the command hierarchy, weakened centralized control. Competition between army leadership and mercenary units led to reduced combat effectiveness, increased internal conflicts and the loss of a unified military strategy.

III. Economic Bloc: Creating the Illusion of Stability

Economic agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Economic Development played a key role in fostering a false sense of stability. Instead of realistically assessing the consequences of potential isolation, they promoted a narrative of economic "invulnerability" remained silent about structural dependence on imports, technology and foreign currency reserves, and sent misleading signals to both society and the political leadership.

During this period a premature strategy of financial self-isolation was adopted with abandonment of currency mechanisms and the blocking of Russia’s own integration into the international financial system without possessing sustainable and effective alternatives.

IV. Information Environment and Society: Lack of Feedback

State propaganda became not only a tool of legitimizing the war but an independent force shaping a distorted picture of reality. Media suppressed any alternative viewpoints and discredited criticism. A narrative of "quick victory" and national unity was created, one that did not reflect the actual situation.

This lack of feedback between society and the authorities is a fundamental issue. A significant part of the population either passively approved the use-of-force scenario or remained apathetic. Under an authoritarian model such information insulation makes course correction impossible even in the presence of critical signals.

V. Geopolitical Illusions: Myths Instead of Analysis

At the systemic level foreign policy decisions were based on deep-rooted misconceptions such as belief in Russia’s “irreplaceability” as an energy supplier, conviction in the West’s weakness, fragmentation and moral decay, and a refusal to use diplomacy and international law as tools of influence.

Instead of building strategic alliances, Russia opted for confrontation initiating its own isolation and loss of global agency. Geopolitical illusions served as a convenient justification but failed to compensate for real weaknesses in the economy, technology and governance.

Responsibility for the failure of strategy is both personalized, concentrated in the hands of the supreme leadership and systemic. It arises from institutional degradation, blurred lines of accountability, the construction of an authoritarian vertical and the refusal to establish the complex but necessary mechanisms of feedback. In such a system the error of one man becomes the error of the entire system and can have catastrophic consequences for the country.

Conclusion

As of 2025, Russia has reached a strategic turning point where every subsequent step will have irreversible consequences. The previous inertia no longer works. The mistakes made have created a situation in which any decision by the authorities, whether to continue the war or freeze it, entails serious costs. The country has found itself in a strategic deadlock, the way out of which will require either a serious transformation of the system or its collapse under its own inertia.

In the short term the most likely scenario remains the inertial one in which Russia continues along the trajectory of a mobilized economy and authoritarian stabilization. At the center of such a model is the priority of military spending, maintaining managed internal loyalty through repression and propaganda and growing dependence on China and a few other partners willing to do business primarily on terms favorable to themselves.

The civilian sector and technological base are degrading, the population’s living standards are declining and social tensions are contained through repressive mechanisms and the suppression of alternative narratives. Foreign policy isolation is becoming entrenched, room for maneuver is narrowing and the country is losing strategic agency increasingly turning into a dependent supplier of raw materials and an executor of others’ geopolitical agendas.

Without a change of course, this scenario leads to prolonged economic exhaustion increasing fragmentation of the system and a possible internal crisis in the medium term. If the system collapses under the weight of accumulated mistakes, Russia will find itself in a new geo-economic protectorate where national resources and key assets will be de facto managed externally, primarily by Beijing, and any attempt at sovereign restoration will be nearly impossible without the consent and conditions of external actors. In other words Russia will return to 1991 but without the West and with a different “guardian.” Economic rehabilitation will no longer follow the Western path of liberalization but will take the form of external dependency, forced concessions and an exchange of sovereignty for short-term stability.

Russia risks entering a phase of state transformation not merely under internal crisis but amid full-scale economic collapse and institutional degradation comparable to, or even worse, than the post-Soviet period. Nationalized private assets, stripped of market value will be fragmented. A significant portion will already have been moved abroad by elites close to power and the remainder will fall under the control of external creditors or strategic partners, primarily China. In these conditions the future restructuring of Russia will not be a conscious recovery but a forced adaptation to external conditions under pressure and without reliance on full domestic resources.

Unlike the collapse of the USSR, the current situation is significantly worsened by the fact that Russia will not be able to avoid full accountability for its aggression, the only questions are of scale, form and timing. The history of major international conflicts shows that political and legal responsibility can be delayed but not canceled. As of now, Russia has already been recognized as an aggressor in several international legal and political formats including UN General Assembly resolutions, proceedings at the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.

However, the international community lacks mechanisms for immediate enforcement, especially regarding a nuclear state with veto power in the UN Security Council. Therefore, the strategy relies on a combination of factors: resource depletion and economic collapse, political transformation within Russia itself, further documentation of damages and legal preparation for future reparations or tribunal processes.

If the current state system of the Russian Federation undergoes regime change, the question of responsibility will be institutionalized in the form of international agreements with the new leadership similar to the denazification of Germany or the recognition of responsibility by Yugoslavia after Milošević. The question is what form it will take—moral, material or criminal responsibility including reparations, asset transfers, tribunals or lustration.

Compared to the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s on the eve of its collapse, the USSR possessed a significantly higher strategic margin of resilience than today’s Russia. Despite economic stagnation the USSR maintained industrial self-sufficiency, a stable bureaucracy, a growing population and the status of a global superpower. Russia, on the other hand, has entered a systemic crisis with resource dependence, a collapsed scientific base, demographic decline, institutional degradation and foreign policy isolation. If the USSR "gradually decayed" from within, Russia risks facing a rapid collapse without strategic reserves and with lost economic sovereignty.